Realtime communication

Livara Chat

Open chat.livara.org for Livara 0.9.12 on web and Android: end-to-end encrypted direct messages and private groups, Android group calls with screen sharing, and an account that is a username and a password.

Current status Active development
Livara Chat showing a synchronized direct conversationLIVE PRODUCT / WEB + ANDROID
Documented capability

Conversations that stay sealed, and recover after interruption.

Livara Chat combines persistent realtime delivery, durable reconnect recovery, expressive media, and connected web and Android clients. Direct-message text, edits, captions and attachments are sealed on the device by the LVR1 hybrid ratchet, which mixes ML-KEM-768 with P-256; compatible private-group content is sealed by LGS1 sender keys. Channel content stays readable by the server, and this page says so rather than rounding the claim up.

  1. 01

    Persistent Socket.IO delivery with contiguous per-user sequence recovery

  2. 02

    One conversation across web and Android, with a durable offline outbox

  3. 03

    LVR1 direct-message encryption: ML-KEM-768 mixed with P-256, advanced before every send

  4. 04

    LGS1 sender-key encryption for compatible private-group text, edits and attachment keys

  5. 05

    Direct calls and 2–6-person Android group rooms over WebRTC DTLS-SRTP, with screen sharing

  6. 06

    Media, voice notes, round video, replies, reactions, stickers and configurable themes

  7. 07

    SRP sign-in and a recovery-phrase key backup, so the server never receives the password

  8. 08

    A published APK SHA-256 and an offline Proof Lab for checking the download yourself

01

Reconnect with a cursor.

A durable event position makes missed intervals visible and recoverable after interruption.

02

Seal what can be sealed. Name what cannot.

Direct messages and compatible private groups are encrypted on the device before anything leaves it. Channels, group membership and delivery metadata are listed as the parts that are not.

03

Refuse rather than downgrade.

When the other device has no current key to seal to, the send stops and says so. There is no quiet fallback to plaintext.

04

Check the build before installing it.

The released APK checksum is published, and the Proof Lab hashes your own download in the browser, offline.

Trust boundary

The limits travel with the capability.

These are not footnotes. They are part of the product description.

  1. 01

    Channels, reactions and some control relationships sit outside the encryption claim; channel content stays readable by the server.

  2. 02

    Private-group membership is supplied by the service, so a compromised server could add an account before sender keys are redistributed.

  3. 03

    Routing, membership, timestamps, ciphertext size and delivery state remain visible to the platform.

  4. 04

    Call media is DTLS-SRTP and is not post-quantum; browser clients do not join the Android group rooms yet.

  5. 05

    Encryption does not protect content on a compromised or unlocked endpoint, and a lost recovery phrase cannot be reissued.

  6. 06

    LVR1 and LGS1 are custom protocols with no independent audit, and no production SLA is claimed here.

Primary sources

Check the living documentation.

Official product siteSecurity modelFeaturesThreat modelProof Lab
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